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SuBACTIVITY-An action was brought seeking a declaratory judgment as
to the constitutionality of New York's Feinberg law. The statute provided that
the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York should list
organizations found to be subversive. Membership in such organizations was
made prima facie disqualification for the position of public school teacher.1 At
the time of suit the Board of Regents had made no listing of subversive groups
nor had any teacher been discharged under the provisions of this enactment.
The supreme court of New York, special term, held the law unconstitutional;2
the appellate division reversep. 3 Held, affirmed. The statute is not a denial of
due process and does not constitute a bill of attainder, because the legislature
CoNsTITUnoNAL LAw-CIVIL lliaHTs-D1scHARGE OF TEACHERS FOR

VERSIVE

1 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946, 1950 Supp.) §3022; see also 16 N.Y:
Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946) §3021; 9 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946) §12-a.
2 Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 274 (1949).
3See Lederman v. Board of Education of City of New York, 276 App. Div. 527, 96
N.Y.S. (2d) 466 (1950); L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents of University of State of New
York, 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 443 (1950).
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has authority to prescribe conditions of employment and removal of public school
teachers. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E. (2d) 806 (1950).
In holding that there is no denial of due process of law under the Feinberg
law the court chiefly relies on the premise that there is no taking of property,
since a public employee has no right to retain his position. 4 Public employ is
considered a privilege which is not protected by the procedural guaranties of
due process applicable to a private right.5 It is held that the legislature as the
public employer can attach any reasonable condition which will advance the
public interest.6 However, it might be objected that the exercise of a privilege
should never be subject to conditions which would be unconstitutional if the
power to withhold the privilege did not exist.7 Yet, the argument of unconstitutional conditions may be avoided and the law upheld, if there is deemed to
be a valid. exercise of a separate governmental power, such as the power of a
state to regulate its public school system. 8 Nor would objections to a purport~d
denial of freedom of speech appear applicable. Cases involving freedom of
speech generally are decided · by applying the clear and present danger test.
This test has had a varied history, 9 but when it is applied today, a legislative
determination that a condition presents a clear and present danger carries considerable weight when a statute is being scrutinized by a court; and in the
present version of the clear and present danger test the danger need not be
shown to ·threaten the existence of the government but only that it threaten
something which is the proper subject of regulation by the govemment.10 Since
4 Superior Engraving Company v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 783; Bruck
v. State ex rel. Money, (Ind. 1950) 91 N.E. (2d) 349; Common School District No. 27
of Gasconade County v. Brinkmann, (Mo. 1950) 233 S.W. (2d) 768; Ladd v. Commonwealth, (Ky. 1950) 233 S.W. (2d) 517; People v. Deatherage, 401 ill. 25, 81 N.E. (2d)
581 (1948); Heinlein v. Anaheim Union High Scliool District, (Cal. App. 1950) 214 P.
(2d) 536.
5 Washington v. McGrath, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 375; Bailey v. Richardson,
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46; McAuliffe v. The Mayor and Aldermen of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See, generally, 11 UNIV. PITT. L. REv. 336
(1950).
o United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947); Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544 (1947).
7 Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 190 (1910). See, also ROTrsCHAEF.BR,
CoNsnTUTIONAL LAw 555-557 (1939); Hale, "Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights," 35 CoL. L. REv. 321 (1935).
8 See American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674
(1950).
9 See Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability,"
48 MrcH. L. REv. 811 (1950).
10 American Communications Association v. Douds, supra note 8; Giboney v. Empire
Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927). Because of the effect of the clear and present danger test and
the superior level afforded the freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment, it has been
suggested that statutes involving abridgment of these freedoms should be presumed invalid.
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, footnote 4, 58 S.Ct. 778
(1938); and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945). But the concept of
presumed invalidity cannot be said to be the prevailing view. See Frankfurter, J., concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949). For a good discussion of the
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the legislature has determined that members of certain groups present such a
danger,11 and because the state has complete control over its school system,
the Feinberg law can be upheld12 by applying ·the present day version of the
clear and present danger test.13 Other arguments against the statute also appear
invalid. Thus, this statute does not improperly delegate legislative power to an
administrative agency, for the standard governing what is a subversive group
is stated to be a group adhering to the doctrine of overthrow of the government
by force, violence, or other unlawful means,14 and this standard has been judicially sanctioned as having a sufficiently clear meaning.15 Although conviction
based on guilt by association has been held to violate due process,16 the Feinberg
law does not authorize any prosecution for crime, nor does it invoke penal
measures.17 The presumption created by the statute seems to have the requisite
rational basis18 since the same acts which may cause a group to be listed as
subversive constitute crimes in New York when performed by an individual.19
A more serious objection is that the Feinberg law itself makes no provision for
judicial review. However specific reference is made to the relevant section of
the state civil service law which provides for the accepted procedure used in other
cases of discharge of public employees.20 Probably more important, the appellate
division has indicated that the findings of the Board of Regents are subject to
review, and that the presumption created by the statute is easily rebutted.21
Until such time as it shall appear that the procedural interpretation indicated is
presumptions used by the lower courts in New York with regard to the Feinberg law, see
45 ILL. L. Rllv. 274 (1950).
11 See 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946, 1950 Supp.) §3022, Declaration of
Policy.
12 American Communications Association v. Douds, supra note 8. Although it might be
possible to obtain the desired discharges without the use of the Feinberg law [see 9 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946) §12-a, and 39 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946)
§160, §161], still the effectiveness of wisdom of a statute is a legislative question, not judicial; see People v. Lloyd, 304 ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922). Moreover, courts have exercised self-restraint in judicial review of state action as public employer. See Keim v. United
States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574 (1900); Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, 123
N.Y. 173, 25 N.E. 274 (1890); 45 ILL. L. R.Ev. 274 at 280 (1950).
13 Usually, however, it is held that conditions for public employ need only meet the
test of reasonableness. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 6.
14 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946, 1950 Supp.) §3022.
15Whitney v. California, supra note 10; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct.
625 (1925); Dunne v. United States, (8th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 137, cert. den. 320
U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 205 (1943), rehear. den. 320 U.S. 814, 64 S.Ct. 426 (1944).
16 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945).
17There is no attempt in the Feinberg law to make membership in a subversive organization a crime, nor are those who are members of such organizations prevented from
exercising their right of free speech elsewhere than in the public schools.
1s Manley v. State of Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 215 (1929); McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Company, 241 U.S. 79, 36 S.Ct. 498 (1916); People v. Mancuso, 255
N.Y. 463, 175 N.E. 177 (1931).
19 Gitlow v. New York, supra note 15.
20 See 9 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946) §12-a.
.
2 1 Lederman v. Board of Education of City of New York, supra note 2; L'Hommedieu
v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, supra note 2.
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not the one intended, the superior courts of New York are correct in declaring
that the statute does not deny due process of law. 22 The contention that the
Feinberg law constitutes a bill of attainder likewise appears invalid, for there is
no condemnation or punishment by legislative action without judicial detennination.28 In addition, although it is not absolutely necessary for a bill of attainder
that those at whom the statute is directed be specifically named, they must be
clearly capable of detennination; 24 and the Feinberg law has no such clarity of
identification.25 Moreover, although permanent exclusion from public service
is sufficient punishment to constitute a bill of attainder,26 many other recent
cases indicate that statutes conditioning the exercise of privileges upon clarification of loyalty are not bills of attainder.27

William H. Bates

22 A change in rules of evidence is not a denial of due process; People v. Turner, 117
N.Y. 227, 22 N.E. 1022 (1889). That the construction state courts place upon a state
statute, and the manner of the statute's administration influence the statute's constitutionality, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper,
supra note 10.
2a Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1866).
24 Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 23; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333
(1866).
25 The only mention in the Feinberg law of any group is made in the preamble and
there not specifically; see 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1946, 1950 Supp.) §3022,
Declaration of Policy. A statute is construed without reference to the preamble unles~
there is an ambiguity. Hammond v. Frankfeld, (Md. 1950) 71 A. (2d) 482. Even if
reference were made to the preamble of the Feinberg law, there still wonld not seem to be
any imposition of penalty without a hearing.
20 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946); Norris v. Doniphan,
61 Ky. (4 Mete.) 385 (1863).
27 American Communications Association v. Douds, supra note 10; Shub v. Simpson,
(Md. 1950) 76 A (2d) 332; Smith v. Director of Civil Service, 324 Mass. 455, 87 N.E.
(2d) 196 (1949). Cf. Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A (2d) 352 (1950); Communist
Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. (2d) 536, 127 P. (2d) 889 (1942).

